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BAIL ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA: BALANCING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND PUBLIC INTEREST

Samson Raphael Osagie, FICMC, Ph.D

*I. INTRODUCTION*
In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, the criminal justice system must maintain a fine equilibrium between safeguarding the liberty of the individual and protecting the collective welfare of society. Bail administration lies at this sensitive intersection. The presumption of innocence is not merely a theoretical principle but a practical legal standard that ensures that no one is punished before conviction. At the same time, public interest demands that justice is not only done but seen to be done, ensuring safety, court attendance, and confidence in the judiciary.
This paper critically explores how the Nigerian legal system, through its laws and judicial decisions, seeks to strike this balance. It examines statutory provisions, landmark cases, contemporary challenges, and offers practical recommendations for a fairer and more efficient bail system.

*II. CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK*
A. Bail: Meaning.
Bail refers to the temporary release of a defendant pending trial, often with the assurance (through sureties or financial bond) that they will appear in court when required. It serves as a safeguard against pre-trial punishment while securing attendance at trial.
In Caleb Ojo v Federal Republic of Nigeria, bail was defined as freeing or setting at liberty one arrested or imprisoned, upon others becoming sureties by recognizance for his appearance at a day or place certainly assigned. The accused/convict person is delivered into the hands of sureties and is accounted by law to be in their custody, though they may, if they will surrender him to court on or before the date assigned, free themselves from further obligations to such suretyship.
The Supreme Court, per Niki Tobi, JSC in the case of Adamu Suleiman & Amor v Commissioner of Plateau State defined bail as “temporal freedom given to an accused person to enable him prepare fully for his trial”. The learned jurist maintained that the main purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at trial, noting that in the exercise of its discretion on bail matters, the court’s decision to grant bail depends on various factors including the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential punishment, the availability of the accused for his trial and the likelihood of the accused interfering with the evidence or witnesses. He noted that the courts discretion to grant bail must be exercised judicially and judiciously.

B. Presumption of Innocence
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, in Section 36(5), affirms that every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until proven guilty [1]. This presumption mandates that detention before conviction should be the exception, not the norm. Presumption of innocence is a cardinal principle of our criminal justice jurisprudence and has its roots not only in our constitution but also in other legal instruments. For example, Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights , 1948, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996 and Article 7 of the African Charter On Human and People’s Rights [2] all of which Nigeria has assented to.
The principle also encapsulates the right of a suspect to remain silent when questioned by authorities until his legal representative is available [3], that the court cannot compel the suspect to give evidence at the trial [4], or prove his innocence [5]. Consequently, it is therefore fundamental that we appreciate this pristine principle of our criminal administration that prior to the conviction of a defendant in any criminal trial, his innocence must be presumed until the court pronounces otherwise upon the evaluation of evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense put forward by the defendant himself.

C. Public Interest Considerations
It is a hallowed principle of Nigerian Constitutional Law jurisprudence that the fundamental human rights encapsulated in the Nigerian Constitution are not, in any way, absolute. Section 45 of the Nigerian Constitution has empowered the State to derogate from all the fundamental rights contained therein, but only in exceptional circumstances, which include the safeguarding of public defence, public safety, public morality, public health and the rights of other individuals. Although these provisions do not apply directly to the rights to bail and rebuttable presumption of innocence, the courts usually exercise a considerable amount of discretion in deciding whether to grant bail in certain circumstances.

The idea of public interests comes into play when one has to balance the rights of one person against the rights of the much larger sect. In considering public interests, we must make recourse to Roscoe Pound’s thoughts on Social Engineering and the Sociological Theory of Law. He conceives of three kinds of legal interests. The first is the private interest, which in this paper, encapsulates the accused’s right to bail and his presumption of innocence. The second is what he calls Public Interests and these are the interests of the State as an entity. The last interest is the social interest (public health, public morality and public safety) and it is this which adequately describes the public interests discussed in this paper. Pound opines that it is the duty of the State to weigh conflicting interests and decide on which is to stand. In so doing, the courts lean more towards ranking public interests higher than private interests and rights.

Public interest in criminal justice administration is at the core of the issues relating to the consideration of citizens liberty and presumption of innocence. The courts must weigh the safety, security and overall wellbeing of the larger society vis-a-vis the individual liberty of the citizen involved in certain kinds of crimes for which the court is conducting trial. In order to be able to do that balancing the Courts must consider factors such as the gravity of the offence, the probability of guilt, the likelihood of the individual committing the same or similar offense in the future or intimidating the witnesses to be called in his trial and the likelihood of the accused taken to flight when granted bail. . This was particularly emphasized in the case of DOKUBO-ASARI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 320, where the Supreme Court held that national security considerations could outweigh personal liberty in certain circumstances. Although this case was not pointedly dealing with bail applications, it is often cited to illustrate the point that public interest considerations are important when dealing with individual conducts which threatens peace and security as against personal liberty.
The Court of Appeal also re-echoed the foregoing principles in the case of ONYEBUCHI V. FRN & ANOR (2007) LPELR-4134 (CA) ratio 3, when it held, inter alia, that
“So if there is any reason to believe that the accused is likely to jump bail or to interfere or influence his trial bail will properly be refused by the trial Court in exercise of its discretion in dealing with the application.”
The court also took a critical look at the constitutional presumption of innocence of a defendant and where there is overwhelming evidence against the defendant and held, inter alia, in the case of ANAEKWE V. COP (1996) 3 NWLR (pt. 436) 320 at 323 ratio 4, that:
“…however, the issue of presumption of innocence cannot arise if there is sufficient probability of guilt on the part of the accused. This is because, if the constitutional provision is applied to the letter in a bail decision, then every accused must be released on bail....... this will not be in the interest of enforcement of criminal process. Such a chaotic situation was never intended by the makers of the constitution.”


*III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING BAIL IN NIGERIA*

A. The Constitution
Section 35(4) provides:
“Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) of this section shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and if he is not tried within a period of –
(a)two months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail; or
(b)three months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who has been released on bail, he shall (without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him) be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date

Section 35 (5) provides
“In subsection (4) of this section, the expression “a reasonable time” means –
(a)in the case of an arrest or detention in any place where there is a court of competent jurisdiction within a radius of forty kilometers, a period of one day; and
(b) in any other case, a period of two days or such longer period as in the circumstances may be considered by the court to be reasonable.

This provision is the Constitutional basis for bail administration under the Nigerian Criminal justice administration. These provisions vest on an accused person the constitutional right to bail and the presumption of his innocence. Niki Tobi, JSC in ADAMU SULEIMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, PLATEAU (Supra) reiterate this thusly:
“The right of bail, a constitutional right, is contractual in nature. The effect of granting bail is not to set the accused free for all times in criminal process but to release him from the custody of the law and to entrust him to appear at his trial at a specific time and place…….”

In Akaolisa v. Okuma & Anor (2025) LPELR-81140(SC), the Court reiterated the point that the purpose of bail is not to terminate criminal proceedings against the accused, but to grant temporary release from custody. The purpose of Section 35(4) of the Constitution is to ensure that when a person is arrested he or she is brought before a court within a reasonable time, and where this is not done, such a person must be released conditionally or unconditionally[6].

B. Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 (The Administration of Criminal Justice Laws of the various States of the Federation)
The ACJA introduced a human rights-focused approach to bail. Section 158 of ACJA, 2015 provides:
“When a person who is suspected to have committed an offence is arrested and detained, or appears, or is brought before a court, he shall, subject to the provisions of this part, be entitled to bail”
The Courts have held in the case of HARRISON v THE STATE [7] that the provision of Section 158 of the ACJA pre-supposes that a defendant is mandatorily entitled to be granted bail by the court right from the outset.
However, the right to bail by a suspect under the ACJA is not absolute, neither is it automatic in all cases. That is why Section 161 (1) provides that:
“A suspect arrested, detained or charged with an offence punishable with death shall only be admitted to bail by a judge of the high Court, under exceptional circumstances” [8]

The Act however defined the exceptional circumstances under which a court may grant bail in capital offence.

Section 161(2) provides:
“For the purpose of exercise of discretion in subsection (1) of this section, 'exceptional circumstance' includes:
• (a) ill health of the applicant which shall be confirmed and certified by a qualified medical practitioner employed in a Government hospital, provided that the suspect is able to prove that there are no medical facilities to take care of his illness by the authority detaining him ;

(b) extraordinary delay in the investigation, arraignment and prosecution for a period exceeding one year; or

(c) any other circumstances that the Judge may, in the particular facts of the case, consider exceptional.”
In ACHINULO v. FRN (2018) LPELR-46203(CA), the Court of appeal in considering the exceptional circumstances under which bail can be granted under Section 161(2) emphasized inter alia that:


“The grant of bail pending trial is at the discretion of the court. It is a discretion exercised based on the materials presented before the Court. In order for the discretion to be judicial and judicious it has to be guided by law or equitable principles. See DOKUBO-ASARI vs. FRN (2007) LPELR (958) 1 at 33 and JOHNSON vs. FRN (2016) LPELR (41115) 1 at 36-38 and 52-53. Now, the whole concept of bail is not to set a defendant free, bail is merely to release him from the custody of the law and to entrust him to a surety or sureties duly authorized to ensure his appearance at a specific time and place. The primary object of bail pending trial is to grant pre-trial freedom to a defendant whose appearance in Court can be compelled by a financial sanction in the form of money bail: NWUDE vs. FGN (2014) 41 WRN 124 at 145 and SULEMAN vs. COP (2008) 8 NWLR (PT 1089) 298. As earlier stated, the lower Court did not find the materials on which the Appellant premised his application to be released on bail pending trial on grounds of ill-health satisfactory and exercised its discretion by refusing to grant bail……….The Administration of Criminal Justice Act stipulates thus: "163, In any other circumstances other than those referred to in Sections 161 and 162 of this Act, the defendant shall be entitled to bail, unless the Court sees reasons to the contrary." (Emphasis supplied) .So the lower Court has the discretion to refuse bail where it sees reasons to the contrary provided that it is a judicial and judicious exercise of discretion. The lower Court did not find reason to exercise discretion in favour of admitting the Appellant to bail because Exhibit B, the Medical Report relied on by the Appellant, stated that the Appellant's ailment can be managed in the prison clinic (see page 162 of the Records). …After an insightful consideration of materials furnished by the Appellant, I agree with the lower Court that there is no credible material authenticating the ill-health on the basis of which discretion could have been exercised in favour of granting the application within the prescriptions of the law. Since the exercise of discretion by the lower Court was judicial and judicious, this Court cannot interfere to set it aside. See ADEJUMO vs. AYANTEGBE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT 110) 417 at 438."[9]
Per OGAKWU, JCA (Pp. 11-16, para C.

Other than exceptional circumstances, Section 165 of ACJA empowers courts to exercise its discretion to grant bail on certain conditions with due regard to the circumstances of the case and those conditions must not be excessive. In other words, in cases where the courts exercises its discretion to grant bail the law stipulates that the conditions upon which the bail is granted must be reasonable.
It is important to state that most States have domesticated the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 to replace their hitherto Criminal Procedure Law for Southern Nigeria and Criminal Procedure Code for the Northern States.
In Edo State for instance, the provisions for administration of bail are in Sections 161, 162 and 163 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Edo State, 2018 and the provisions are in pari materia with those of ACJA
Under the Administration of Criminal Law of Edo State, 2018, even though what the court should consider as exceptional circumstances are enumerated, the enactment went further in Section 161 (2) (c) to allow the Judge to consider any particular fact and regard same as an exceptional circumstance. This is highly commendable, as the law seeks to protect the rights of persons being tried for capital offences.
On the whole, Section 162 of the ACJA/ACJL provides that generally a defendant who is charged with an offence with imprisonment exceeding three years and above shall be entitled to bail upon an application to the court except in the following circumstances:
(a) where there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant will, where released on bail, commit another offence;
(b) attempt to evade his trial;
(c) attempt to influence, interfere with, intimidate witnesses, and or interfere in the investigation of the case;
(d) attempt to conceal or destroy evidence;
(e) prejudice the proper investigation of the offence; or
(f) undermine or jeopardize the objectives or the purpose or the functioning of the criminal justice administration, including the bail system.
Section 163, provides that in any other circumstance other than those referred to in sections 161 and 162 of this Law, the defendant shall be entitled to bail, unless the court sees reasons to the contrary.
An interesting provision is Section 169 of ACJA/ACJL which provides for the reconsideration of bail by the court and it provides “Where a defendant has been admitted to bail and circumstances arise which in the opinion of the Attorney-General of the Federation would justify the court in cancelling the bail or requiring a greater amount, a court may, on application being made by the Attorney-General of the Federation, issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant and, after giving the defendant an opportunity of being heard, may commit him to prison to await trial, or admit him to bail for the same or an increased amount”.
This provision, although has not received judicial interpretation or pronouncement but its import is significant in addressing cases of abuse of bail granted to certain categories of suspects who may breach the terms of bail to them or commits further offences.

*IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND CASE LAW.*
Over the years the Courts have been instrumental in developing bail jurisprudence in Nigeria with the result bail administration has remained and followed a consistent pattern of reasoning from trial Courts to appellate Courts. In BAMAIYI v. STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270 – The Court of Appeal emphasized that bail must not be refused merely on the basis of the gravity of the offence; instead, the prosecution must prove why pre-trial detention is necessary. The Court in EGWUMI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC of NIGERIA (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1338) 270 reiterated the principle that bail is a constitutional right which cannot be denied arbitrarily
In DANJUMA GOJE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC of NIGERIA [10], the Court of Appeal held that mere allegations of corruption without cogent evidence of interference or flight risk is not enough to deny bail.
In FANI-KAYODE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC NIGERIA [11]– The court reiterated that the conditions for bail must not be excessive or punitive.
While pronouncing on administrative bail, the Supreme Court warned in OKEKE v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1374) 123 that bail must not become a source of revenue generation, as it undermines the justice system.
However, it is pertinent to point out that the Courts have consistently worked strenuously to strike a balance between the need to uphold the right to presumption of innocence of the defendant and the need to protect the society from very dangerous criminally minded individuals as shown in ONYEBUCHI V. FRN, Supra and ANAEKWE V. COP, Supra.


*V. CHALLENGES IN BALANCING THE ACT*
There are two implications inherent in section 162 of the ACJA as regards refusing bail on the ground of the possibility of the commission of another offence. The first implication is that it indeed raises the question of public interests as regards safeguarding the interests of other citizens and the state. This happens to be positive. But the mere usage of the words ‘another offence’ raises the inference that the accused person applying for bail did commit the first offence for which he is applying for bail. This provision seems to take away his right to presumption of innocence. This is the second implication. It should be recalled that the provisions of section 45(2) of the Constitution allow a derogation from the rights contained in sections 33 and 35 only in periods of emergency. This indubitably means that the presumption of innocence must remain untouchable, unless it is disproved.

The courts have experienced difficulties in its attempts to strike a balance between upholding the right to bail by suspects and safeguarding the safety and security of the public at large. In OBUM OSAKWE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA [11] the Court of appeal held “that the constitutional provision of Section 36(5) which provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty has not been breached against the applicant/appellant in this instance as it is not absolute right, for in the consideration of the application, all factors have to be considered by the courts………………….”. See BAMAIYI v. STATE [12].


In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal in COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, LAGOS STATE & ORS v. MR. OKWUCHUKWUKWU OBIECHINA & ANOR [13] held among other things that “The right to personal liberty enshrined in Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution is not an absolute right. It is a right which can be interfered with upon reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime…”
The following are some of the challenges in the attempt to strike a balance between the right of suspects to and the interest of the public in the criminal justice administration


Judicial Discretion and Inconsistency
Kitai as presented an argument on the American bail jurisprudence that the presumption of innocence applies merely to the trial stage of the defendant and does not extend to the pre-trial stage. The purport of this jurisprudence is that the presumption of innocence should be used merely a an evidentiary tool in the trial process. A liberal approach to the Nigerian criminal law jurisprudence will reveal that the presumption of innocence is paramount in the trial of the defendant. Nigerian jurisprudence provides that upon the conviction of the defendant, the presumption of innocence in his favour adeems, and bail no longer becomes as of right. This invariably means that the presumption of innocence cannot apply to every stage of the defendant's journey to innocence.

There should be an understanding that the fact that a defendant is presumed innocent does not preclude him from being tried. In fact, it is in relation to criminal trials that the presumption of innocence can arise. It means therefore that the presumption remains untouched even during the bail application process, but must be present to allow the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. As the US Supreme Court held in Bell v Wolfish, the detention of the accused (or the bail applicant) is not treated as punishment which would ordinarily be meted out to an accused, but is treated as a mechanism to ensure his attendance at his trial.

It is necessary to revisit the ‘sufficient probability of guilt’ test laid down in ANAEKWE V COP, supra. The Court’s reasoning must be that to safeguard public interests, the presumption of innocence as enshrined in the constitution must not be taken to its extremes. The question that must be asked at this point is ‘on what grounds would one hold that there is sufficient probability of guilt when the case for the defendant has not been heard?’ It is tantamount to declaring the defendant guilty at an earlier time before the parties proceed to trial. If the presumption of innocence were to indeed be the foundations of bail jurisprudence in Nigeria, then everyone accused would be granted bail. The courts must then exercise discretion, not on the presumption of innocence (for this is not subject to bargain or discretion), but on other factors that have been mentioned.

But while discretion allows flexibility, it has also led to arbitrariness and inconsistency. The lack of clear parameters often leads to unequal treatment, especially when public opinion or media pressure is involved. The Supreme Court frowned at the arbitrary and wild exercise of judicial discretion when it held, inter alia, in the case of WAZIRI V. GUMEL & ANOR. (2012) Vol. 209 LRCN 40 at 46 ratio 4, that “............all discretionary powers must be exercised with correct and convincing reasons.......”. Accordingly, the belief that there is clear evidence against the defendant should be interpreted to mean the tendency of the defendant to abscond.

In Gani Adams v Attorney-General of the Federation, the Court of Appeal mentioned, inter alia, that the criminal antecedents of the defendant were to be considered in granting bail. This criterion presupposes that the Court relies on past acts to dispel the presumption of innocence in favour of the defendant. Very often it is not uncommon to find the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion even in criminal matters in which the suspects have proven time and again to be serious threats to public safety and even in matters where suspects are framed up to achieved certain political ends. This practice not only undermines the justice system but also blatantly prejudices public safety or the citizen’s rights as the case may be. Thus, in the absence of clear cut legal parameters which permits the courts to grant or refuse bail to suspects, abuse of judicial discretion as it is the case in the extant regime of our criminal justice administration is inevitable.


Ineffective Legal Representation
It is not uncommon to find that legal representation of both the State and defendants is experiencing a downward slide in terms of quality advocacy, particularly in the bulk of matters involving indigent and unenlightened defendants who have become perpetual offenders or even victims of criminal activities. This scenario creates a vacuum for effective legal advocacy to guide the courts in certain bail matters thereby leaving the courts with no proper guide to make decisions in bail matters.Without effective advocacy, courts are less informed when making bail decisions.

Delays Occasioned by Overcrowded Courts’ Docket and Correctional Centers
Nowadays, extended pre-trial detentions are common in correctional centers and custodial homes. According to the Nigerian Correctional Service (2023), over 70% of inmates are awaiting trial [13]. The delay in trials of defendants are primarily due to overloaded court dockets of Judges and the inability of the Correctional Centers to effectively produce inmates in courts for trials owing to overstretched facilities. Sadly, not even the review of the constitution placing Correctional services in the Concurrent Legislative list has helped matters as most states of the Federation are yet to take the initiative to invest in the establishment and provision of Correctional facilities
This not only slowed down the criminal justice administration process but creates further threats to individual liberty and societal wellbeing, which ultimately does not help the development of the justice system.

Public Pressure, Perception and Stigma
The central theme in criminal law jurisprudence, as well as in other jurisprudence, is that the judge hearing an application for bail is human and is to a certain degree influenced by certain factors. In high-profile or sensational cases, the public may perceive bail as a sign of leniency or complicity. In the Nigerian layman jurisprudence, bail translates to acquittal. This can influence judicial decisions even when legally unjustified. In many cases, even though bail is not indicative of a grant of freedom from prosecution for the suspect, public perception which in most cases has been validated is that once the courts grants bail to high profile offenders, the cases more or less comes to an end. As a result, the purpose of using bail to get the defendant to prepare for his trial becomes defeated as more often than not, such case dies naturally. This is an anathema to the philosophy of bail administration as it relates to both the individual suspect and the interest of the public.


*VI. STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT*
a. Judicial Training and Guidelines
There is need for regular and periodic training and development for judicial officers on standard bail guidelines to assist in navigating complex circumstances requiring the exercise of judicial discretion, judiciously and judicially in the interest of the criminal justice administration can to ensure fairness and consistency.

B. Strengthening Legal Aid
The Legal Aid Council, the NBA and NGOs should give more support to providing pro bono services for indigent defendants. Although the accused person has a constitutional right to defend himself in person or through a legal practitioner, he may not be able to canvass his points as to why he should be released on bail.


c. Monitoring and Accountability
Establishing bail supervision units under the judiciary or Ministry of Justice can improve enforcement and tracking. There is the need to establish in every jurisdiction the bail management system to avoid abuse of court process and effective tracking of persons admitted to bail. This is actually contained in the new National Minimum Standards Document [14] on the implementation of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and ACJL of the various States. For example Part 1, paragraph 9.0 provides among other things “The heads of court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall establish a Bail Information Management Systems (BIMS) that is designed to capture information such as names, biometric data, NIN, and any other relevant data of suspects/defendants and their sureties for all bails processed through the courts”

d. Public Education
The public must be sensitized to understand that bail is not acquittal, and that defendants even though presumed innocent until conviction, are expected to face their trial to defend themselves and where they fail to do so they may nonsense of their constitutional rights to bail and that may affect the outcome of their trial and the attitude of courts towards similar matters

*VII. CONCLUSION*
The administration of bail in Nigeria remains one of the most delicate and impactful aspects of our criminal justice system. It reflects our commitment to human rights, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. However, the tension between protecting liberty and preserving public order remains a real and constant challenge.
Judges, prosecutors, lawyers, law enforcement officers, and policymakers must work together to develop a culture of respect for due process while ensuring that justice is not compromised in the name of expediency.
On the whole let me end with the illuminating dictum of Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JCA now JSC in THE STATE v. ONWE EGEDE[15] when she held with respect to the administration of Criminal cases thusly:
“I must say that justice is a three way street. There must be justice to the society, justice to the accused person and justice to the victim of crime. In our adversarial system, it is erroneous of the judex to constitute himself into the cheerleader for the defence team or the prosecution team. The Court should be an independent umpire”
Ultimately, an independent unbiased judiciary will promote the rule of law through respect and obedience to constitutional order, protection of the rights of citizens and ensuring that societal wellbeing.
I therefore thank the Nigerian Bar Association, Ondo City Branch, for this opportunity to engage with this critical subject. As we navigate the evolving landscape of legal reforms in Nigeria, let us recommit ourselves to the values of justice, fairness, and balance that lie at the core of our profession.

Rt. Hon Samson R Osagie, FICMC,Ph.D
Hon Attorney General & Commissioner of Justice, Edo State.

REFERENCES
[1] Section 36(5). Constitution of the FRN 1999(as amended)
[2]See African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, CAP A9, LFN, 2004
[3] Section 36(2) of the Constitution of the FRN 1999(as amended)
[4] Section 36(11), ibid
[5]Section 138, Evidence Act, CAP E14, LFN. 2004; See Also IFEJIRIKA v. THE STATE (1999)6 NWLR (Pt.593)@ P.62 and OGUBUNJO v. THE STATE(1996) 6NWLR (452) 78 @ 80.
[6] See EGWUMI v. FRN (2013)2 NWLR (Pt1338)270
[7](2019)LPELR-48940(CA)
[8] See also Sections 118 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 49 Vol.II, Law of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976( as applicable to Edo State) and also Section 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[9] See also SALISU V. C.O.P (2018) LPELR-49926(CA)
[10] (2019) LPELR-47166(CA)
[11] (2003) LPELR-8215(CA)
[12] (2001)8 NWLR (Pt.715)270@292
[13] 2024 Edition, Issued Under the Authority of the Hon Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Prince Lateef Fagbemi, SAN, FNIALS, LL.D (HC) by the The Centre For Socio-Legal Studies(CSLS).
[14] Nigerian Correctional Service Annual Report, 2023
vice Annual Report, 2023.

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